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Article 
Confronting the Wizard of Oz:  
National Security, Expertise, and Secrecy 
DAVID COLE 
Aziz Rana’s account of the takeover of American national security by experts, and of the 
public’s acceptance of that state of affairs, offers an important and novel perspective on what 
ails us in national security today.  In this Comment, I suggest that while Rana is correct to 
identify our deference to experts as a central aspect of the problem, the problem is more 
complicated.  First, the phenomenon of elite control over foreign and security policy questions is 
not new, but likely dates back to the founding—when elites ruled not based on expertise but on 
the basis of status, class, and legal barriers to more popular input.  Second, deference to 
expertise is not just an ideological assumption of the modern age, but is also a rational response 
to greater threats and increased complexity.  Third, deference may rest as much on secrecy as it 
does on epistemological assumptions about national security information.  Because of 
classification, the general public often lacks not just expertise, but the very facts necessary to 
make an informed assessment. 
That said, Rana’s reminder of the importance of popular decision-making on national 
security policy is an important one.  Unwarranted deference to experts (especially when they 
make judgments on secret information) not only undermines democratic legitimacy, but may 
induce poor decision-making, by facilitating groupthink and other biases.  And most importantly, 
decisions about national security are never only about national security; they nearly always 
implicate other values, such as privacy, liberty, or human dignity.  The national security experts 
have no expertise in assessing the normative questions that conflicts with these values raise.  
Those normative questions must be made by us all. 
 
  
Confronting the Wizard of Oz:  
National Security, Expertise, and Secrecy 
DAVID COLE* 
When I need to use the remote control for our television, I call my 
fifteen-year old son.  It’s not exactly that I am incapable of understanding 
the remote (or at least I don’t think so).  It’s just that he’s so much better at 
it, has so much more experience with it, and I use it so infrequently that I 
defer to his expertise.  Aziz Rana’s account of the American public’s 
relationship to national security tells a similar story.  The public, he argues, 
has deferred to the executive branch, and in particular to the national 
security agencies therein, on questions of security.1  In his view, this 
deference reflects an epistemological shift, from a period when we viewed 
knowledge about security matters to be equally accessible by everyone, to 
the modern period in which we have delegated responsibility to a relatively 
small and insulated coterie of “experts” in the executive branch.2  No 
constitutional concerns are implicated by my delegation of the remote to 
my son. But the public’s delegation of national security matters to the so-
called experts, Rana maintains, has profound implications for 
constitutional democracy.3  Until we learn to use the remote, we will never 
be masters of our own destiny. 
Rana’s account of the epistemological underpinnings of the national 
security state offers an astute and novel perspective on a familiar story.  
Few would dispute that the national security agenda is today dominated by 
agencies in the executive branch.4  Other scholars have identified different 
causes for this development.  Many have pointed to such factors as the 
growth of the administrative state; the increasingly interventionist role the 
United States plays in the world; the rise of technological threats such as 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1417, 1422–23 (2012). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 1420–22. 
4 Actually, there are some who do dispute this.  Former Vice President Richard Cheney, and his 
right-hand man David Addington, believe that the executive has been too hemmed in by legal 
restrictions since the Watergate and Vietnam era.  Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Attorney General 
Held Firm on War Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at A1.  Jack Goldsmith, who served as a top 
lawyer in the Bush administration, also maintains that the executive branch generally, and especially on 
matters of national security, has never before been so legally regulated and controlled.  JACK 
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 64–70 (2007).  But this plainly is a minority view, and certainly 
seems to be have been belied by the actions of the Bush administration itself. 
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nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; the spread of international 
terrorism; and the risks posed by the increasing interconnectedness of the 
globalized world.5  But Rana adds a further dimension, attributing the 
evolution to a shift in how the American public thinks about national 
security.  In his view, the modern era has erroneously accepted the view 
that security matters should be left to “the experts.”6  Until we successfully 
challenge that assumption, he contends, legal reforms addressed to the 
problem are doomed to fail.7 
Rana is right to focus our attention on the assumptions that frame 
modern Americans’ conceptions about national security, but his 
assessment raises three initial questions.  First, it seems far from clear that 
there ever was a “golden” era in which national security decisions were 
made by the common man, or “the people themselves,” as Larry Kramer 
might put it.8  Rana argues that neither Hobbes nor Locke would support a 
worldview in which certain individuals are vested with superior access to 
the truth, and that faith in the superior abilities of so-called “experts” is a 
phenomenon of the New Deal era.9  While an increased faith in scientific 
solutions to social problems may be a contributing factor in our current 
overreliance on experts,10  I doubt that national security matters were ever 
truly a matter of widespread democratic deliberation. 
Rana notes that in the early days of the republic, every able-bodied 
man had to serve in the militia, whereas today only a small (and largely 
disadvantaged) portion of society serves in the military.11  But serving in 
the militia and making decisions about national security are two different 
matters.  The early days of the Republic were at least as dominated by 
“elites” as today.  Rana points to no evidence that decisions about foreign 
                                                                                                                          
5 See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 11 (2010) (discussing the power of the executive branch to steer the agenda of 
the legislature or act unilaterally); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Epilogue to ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., 
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 420, 420–21 (2004) (stating that the powers of president to dictate foreign 
relations have grown unchecked in the last fifty years); GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN 
PRESIDENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 1 (2010) (“Only one part of the government had the 
supreme power, the Bomb, and all else must defer to it, for the good of the nation, for the good of the 
world, for the custody of the future, in a world of perpetual emergency superseding ordinary 
constitutional restrictions.”); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE 
L.J. 1385, 1402–04 (1989) (discussing how the proliferation of nuclear weapons elevated the powers of 
the executive so as to respond to an emergency). 
6 Rana, supra note 1, at 1476. 
7 Id. at 1483. 
8 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004) (arguing that the common people of the United States have a pivotal role in 
constitutional law). 
9 Rana, supra note 1, at 1426, 1448. 
10 Id. at 1452. 
11 Id. at 1437–38; see also Ann Scott Tyson, Youths in Rural U.S. Are Drawn to Military, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 4, 2005, at A1. 
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affairs were any more democratic then than now.  And, of course, the 
nation as a whole was far less democratic, as the majority of its inhabitants 
could not vote at all.12  Rather than moving away from a golden age of 
democratic decision-making, it seems more likely that we have simply 
replaced one group of elites (the aristocracy) with another (the experts). 
Second, to the extent that there has been an epistemological shift with 
respect to national security, it seems likely that it is at least in some 
measure a response to objective conditions, not just an ideological 
development.  If so, it’s not clear that we can solve the problem merely by 
“thinking differently” about national security.  The world has, in fact, 
become more interconnected and dangerous than it was when the 
Constitution was drafted.  At our founding, the oceans were a significant 
buffer against attacks, weapons were primitive, and travel over long 
distances was extremely arduous and costly.  The attacks of September 11, 
2001, or anything like them, would have been inconceivable in the 
eighteenth or nineteenth centuries.  Small groups of non-state actors can 
now inflict the kinds of attacks that once were the exclusive province of 
states.  But because such actors do not have the governance responsibilities 
that states have, they are less susceptible to deterrence. The Internet makes 
information about dangerous weapons and civil vulnerabilities far more 
readily available, airplane travel dramatically increases the potential range 
of a hostile actor, and it is not impossible that terrorists could obtain and 
use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.13 The knowledge necessary 
to monitor nuclear weapons, respond to cyber warfare, develop 
technological defenses to technological threats, and gather intelligence is 
increasingly specialized. The problem is not just how we think about 
security threats; it is also at least in part objectively based. 
Third, deference to expertise is not always an error; sometimes it is a 
rational response to complexity.  Expertise is generally developed by 
devoting substantial time and attention to a particular set of problems.  We 
cannot possibly be experts in everything that concerns us.  So I defer to my 
son on the remote control, to my wife on directions (and so much else), to 
the plumber on my leaky faucet, to the electrician when the wiring starts to 
fail, to my doctor on my back problems, and to my mutual fund manager 
on investments.  I could develop more expertise in some of these areas, but 
that would mean less time teaching, raising a family, writing, swimming, 
                                                                                                                          
12 See Ed Crews, Voting in Early America, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG OFFICIAL HISTORY SITE, 
http://www.history.org/foundation/journal/spring07/elections.cfm (last visited Mar. 20, 2012) (“[B]y 
modern standards, the right to vote in colonial American was narrow, and there were fewer 
opportunities for its exercise.”). 
13 CTR. FOR COUNTERPROLIFERATION RES., NAT’L DEF. UNIV., CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, 
RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE THREAT ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT 
UNCLASSIFIED LITERATURE 1 (2002). 
 2012] CONFRONTING THE WIZARD OF OZ 1621 
 
and listening to music.  The same is true, in greater or lesser degrees, for 
all of us.  And it is true at the level of the national community, not only for 
national security, but for all sorts of matters.  We defer to the 
Environmental Protection Agency on environmental matters, to the Federal 
Reserve Board on monetary policy, to the Department of Agriculture on 
how best to support farming, and to the Federal Aviation Administration 
and the Transportation Security Administration on how best to make air 
travel safe.  Specialization is not something unique to national security.  It 
is a rational response to an increasingly complex world in which we cannot 
possibly spend the time necessary to gain mastery over all that affects our 
daily lives. 
If our increasing deference to experts on national security issues is in 
part the result of objective circumstances, in part a rational response to 
complexity, and not necessarily less “elitist” than earlier times, then it is 
not enough to “think differently” about the issue.  We may indeed need to 
question the extent to which we rely on experts, but surely there is a role 
for expertise when it comes to assessing threats to critical infrastructure, 
devising ways to counter those threats, and deploying technology to secure 
us from technology’s threats.  As challenging as it may be to adjust our 
epistemological framework, it seems likely that even if we were able to 
sheer away all the unjustified deference to “expertise,” we would still need 
to rely in substantial measure on experts. 
The issue, in other words, is not whether to rely on experts, but how to 
do so in a way that nonetheless retains some measure of self-government.  
The need for specialists need not preclude democratic decision-making.  
Consider, for example, the model of adjudication.  Trials involving 
products liability, antitrust, patents, and a wide range of other issues 
typically rely heavily on experts.14  But critically, the decision is not left to 
the experts.  The decision rests with the jury or judge, neither of whom 
purports to be an expert.  Experts testify, but do so in a way that allows for 
adversarial testing and requires them to explain their conclusions to 
laypersons, who render judgment informed, but not determined, by the 
expert testimony. 
Similarly, Congress routinely acts on matters over which its members 
are not experts.  Congress enacts laws governing a wide range of very 
complex issues, yet expertise is not a qualification for office.  Members of 
                                                                                                                          
14 See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges?  
The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 1–3 
(2011) (discussing the “expert witness boom in antitrust and a handful of other areas over the last 
several decades”); M. Neil Browne et al., The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic 
Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 1–4 (1998) (discussing the frequent use of expert witness testimony in 
litigation involving hazardous products); Michael H. Jester, Patent Law Experts: Their Selection and 
Role in Patent Litigation, INTEL. PROP. TODAY, Dec. 2004, at 32 (explaining importance of patent law 
experts in patent litigation). 
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Congress, like many political appointees in the executive branch, listen to 
and consider the views of experts to inform their decisions. Congress 
delegates initial consideration of most problems to committees, and by 
serving on those committees and devoting time and attention to the 
problems within their ambit, members develop a certain amount of 
expertise themselves.  They may hire staff who have still greater expertise, 
and they hold hearings in which they invite testimony from still other 
experts.  But at the end of the day, the decisions about what laws should be 
passed are made by the Congress as a whole, not by the experts. 
A similar process operates in the executive branch.  The President and 
Vice-President generally need not be experts in any particular field, and 
many of the cabinet members they appoint are not necessarily experts 
either.  They are managers and policy makers.  They spend much of their 
day being briefed by people with more specialized expertise than they 
have.  But at the end of the day, the important decisions are made by 
politically accountable actors. 
Thus, deference to experts need not preclude independent or 
democratically accountable decision-making.  The larger problem may be 
one that Rana notes but does not sufficiently emphasize—an inordinate 
reliance on classified information and covert operations.15  Secrecy is in 
many ways the ultimate enemy of democracy in the national security 
realm.16  As Judge Damon Keith has written, “democracy dies behind 
closed doors.”17  The experts in the intelligence community have the power 
to hide their decisions from external review and checks by classifying the 
information they consider or the actions they take.18  Even if they do so in 
good faith, the inevitable result is that their actions are increasingly 
insulated from scrutiny by others and immune from democratic checks.  
Virtually everyone who has had access to classified information concedes 
that the system leads to massive over-classification.19  Our overreliance on 
secrecy may well be more central to the problem of inordinate deference 
than assumptions about the nature of knowledge regarding security.  And 
                                                                                                                          
15 See Rana, supra note 1, at 1475–76 (describing the vast secret security infrastructure in the 
United States). 
16 See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY 154, 165–66 (1998) (asserting that a culture of 
secrecy developed in response to concerns about the Communist Party, which resulted in a closed 
society that fell far short of democratic ideals and security programs that were inadequate and 
uncoordinated). 
17 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (invalidating secret 
immigration hearing for detainee apprehended in the wake of terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001). 
18 See ELIZABETH GOITEIN & DAVID M. SHAPIRO, BRENNAN CTR. JUST., REDUCING 
OVERCLASSIFICATION THROUGH ACCOUNTABILITY 12 (2011) (explaining that original classifier—the 
first people to classify information—“are the only officials empowered to determine what information 
merits classification”). 
19 Id.; see generally DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF 
THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE (2011). 
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in any event, the problems are mutually reinforcing.  The inaccessibility of 
the information the experts rely upon compels us to defer to them because 
we lack sufficient grounds to question them.  And that, in turn, may well 
make the experts more protective of their information and more likely to 
classify their actions, decisions, and considerations. 
If this analysis is correct, then we must overcome not only the 
epistemological problem that Rana cites, but the problem of overreliance 
on secrecy as well.  Experts can inform rather than supplant democratic 
decision-making only if we treat national security questions as appropriate 
for public deliberation, and if there is sufficient transparency to permit the 
decisions to be adequately informed. 
Rana stakes his claim for change on democratic legitimacy.  Leaving 
such important decisions to unelected “experts” cannot be squared with the 
democratic foundations upon which our society rests, he argues.20  But 
there are at least two additional reasons, beyond democratic legitimacy, for 
resisting wholesale deference to the national security experts.  First, many 
of the decisions that must be made in the security field involve more than 
questions of security.  Surveillance issues, for example, almost inevitably 
involve a weighing of privacy interests against security concerns.  
Interrogation practices require us to balance the need for intelligence 
against interests in respecting human dignity and autonomy.  Detention 
questions inevitably require a balancing of liberty and security.  National 
security experts may well have expertise with respect to the security side of 
the equation on such questions, but there is no reason to think that they are 
experts in privacy, liberty, or human dignity.  Indeed, precisely because of 
their specialized focus on security, they are ill-suited to weigh other 
concerns against security concerns.  As Justice David Souter wrote in 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld:21  
In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on 
what is a reasonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether 
in peace or war (or some condition in between) is not well 
entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose 
particular responsibility is to maintain security.  For 
reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the 
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the 
branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in 
striking the balance between the will to win and the cost in 
liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility for security 
will naturally amplify the claim that security legitimately 
                                                                                                                          
20 Rana, supra note 1, at 1425. 
21 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
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raises.  A reasonable balance is more likely to be reached 
on the judgment of a different branch . . . .22 
How one strikes the balance between liberty and security is a decision 
that may be informed by experts, but is ultimately a normative question 
about the kind of society we want to live in—and that is quintessentially 
not a decision for experts, but for the people. 
Second, even if we bracketed the oft-competing rights concerns, and 
all we cared about was effective security, deference to experts operating 
with secret information behind closed doors might well be 
counterproductive.  Experts are in no way immune from groupthink and 
other decisional biases, and the smaller the circle of actors with the 
requisite knowledge to act, the less likely it is that such errors will be 
corrected.23  Moreover, as the 9/11 Commission found, barriers to the 
sharing of information can greatly undermine the soundness of security 
strategies.24  Stovepiping is an inevitable consequence of specialization and 
classification (because only those with a clearance and a “need to know” 
can then gain access to the information), and makes it less likely that even 
the experts themselves will have access to all the information relevant to 
their decisions.25  Thus, greater transparency may be a benefit not merely 
from the vantage point of democratic legitimacy, as Rana illustrates, but 
also from the normative perspective of striking an appropriate balance, and 
from the pragmatic standpoint of improving security. 
Rana calls our attention to some of the deep philosophical 
undercurrents that have come to define modern attitudes toward national 
security.  The issues are too important to be left to experts, but until we 
challenge our assumptions about the propriety of doing so, he argues, no 
formal legal solution will succeed.  I am sympathetic to Rana’s concerns, 
and seek to support his argument with the three principal points made here.  
First, it is critical to consider the particular role that secrecy, itself 
controlled by experts, plays in constructing and perpetuating “expertise,” 
and in shielding the experts from democratic assessment.  Second, when it 
comes to weighing security against other values, such as privacy, liberty, 
and human dignity, the experts deserve skepticism, not deference.  And 
third, security decisions themselves are often undermined by the barriers 
that secrecy and specialization raise.  Like the Wizard of Oz, national 
security experts operate behind a large screen, and that screen bars us from 
                                                                                                                          
22 Id. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment). 
23 See Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 
97 CAL. L. REV. 301, 323 (2009) (arguing that security decision-making is often skewed by biases that 
might be counteracted through exposure to other perspectives and viewpoints). 
24 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 416 
(2004), available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. 
25 Id. at 417. 
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realizing, as Rana insists, that we are all capable of making the necessarily 
normative judgments about security and liberty that implicate not only the 
survival of our polity, but its survival in the form we choose. 
